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Current and Possible Future U.S. Trade Policies and Practices
- Policy Trends, Dumping and Safeguards
Richard 0. Cunningham*
I. BACKGROUND - THE CONCEPTS UNDERLYING U.S. TRADE
LAWS AND POLICY
have something of a dilemma with regard to the topic originally set
forth in the program materials, a topic which is to focus in substantial
part on "Trade Adjustment Policies." My problem with that topic, to be
brutally frank, is that trade adjustment has never been a very significant
element of U.S. trade policy or practice. It is true that throughout the
post-war era all U.S. administrations have professed to be squarely op-
posed to protectionism. It is also true that the United States recognizes,
as does the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), that
protectionism should be permitted in cases where temporary protection
from imports will enable a seriously injured domestic industry to "ad-
just" to import competition and become competitive again.
In practice, however, no administration has ever really had a coher-
ent trade adjustment policy, nor have there been more than a handful of
cases in which the potential for adjustment (i.e., modernizing, reducing
costs, developing new products or otherwise using a period of temporary
import protection to regain competitiveness with foreign rivals) has been
the decisive issue in a U.S. determination of whether or not to grant im-
port relief under the escape clause section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974
or any other statute. Rather, U.S. decisions on trade issues are motivated
by very different considerations.
In discretionary import relief cases,' decisions almost always result
from the interplay of domestic political forces against diplomatic or stra-
tegic considerations - an interplay which always takes place against a
presumption that import relief should not be granted. That presumption
stems from the basic trade ideology shared to some extent by all post-war
administrations that free trade is desirable, that protectionism is to be
avoided, and that market forces instead of government intervention
should determine success or failure in the marketplace. That predisposi-
tion against discretionary import relief is reinforced where import restric-
* Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, Washington D.C.
I This encompasses decisions under the escape clause (§ 201), the market disruption statute
(§ 406), the National Security Amendment (§ 232), the Agricultural Adjustment Act (§ 22), and
§ 301, which can deal with unjustifiable or unreasonable practices relating to imports, although it
mostly deals with export-related issues.
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tions are perceived to be a threat to continued good relations (diplomatic
or strategic) with one or more important foreign countries. In recent
years, the potential adverse effect of import restrictions on less developed
countries' ability to repay their debts has also weighed heavily against the
petitioners in certain cases. On the other side, some U.S. industries have
achieved import relief simply because their political influence is so im-
mense that some accommodation is thought to be necessary. The steel
and automobile industries come to mind in this regard. The perceived
need to ward off strong protectionist sentiment in the U.S. Congress can
also lead to affirmative discretionary trade decisions. For example, in
September 1985, President Reagan headed off a textile import restriction
bill by announcing an aggressive increase in section 301 activity.
In very few cases, however, does the concept of adjustment play an
important role in trade decisions. The case most often cited as embody-
ing the adjustment principle is the 1984 Harley-Davidson escape clause
action involving imports of heavyweight motorcycles. It is certainly true
that a major element of Harley-Davidson's campaign was a comprehen-
sive (and already partially implemented) adjustment program, encom-
passing cost reduction, implementation of Japanese-style management
techniques, automation, new product development and a number of
other facets. It is also true that, in retrospect, the case demonstrated that
the escape clause statute can work effectively as a significant element in
the resuscitation of an American industry. Harley-Davidson was grant-
ed five years of import restriction relief, yet returned after three and one-
half years to announce that it had completed its adjustment program,
was now fully competitive again and did not need the remaining period
of relief.
Even in the Harley-Davidson case, however, a strong adjustment
argument would not have been sufficient, by itself, to obtain relief. In
addition, the filing of the case had to be timed carefully to take advantage
of election year politics and, much more importantly, a juncture of par-
ticularly severe stress in U.S.-Japan trade relations. This meant that the
administration was receptive to the proposition that tough action against
Japan on a highly visible (but not massive in terms of trade) product
would be a good way to deal with political pressures for tough anti-Japan
measures. This strategy, together with using Harley-Davidson's high
level of public visibility to generate substantial congressional interest,
was at least as significant as the adjustment arguments in obtaining the
restrictions.
In the other major category of U.S. trade cases2 there is another set
of considerations that must be understood if one is to deal constructively
with U.S. trade law and policy. This set of considerations relates to what
is considered "fair" and "unfair" in international trade. While often de-
2 These are nondiscretionary proceedings under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws
and under § 337, dealing with patent, copyright and trademark infringement.
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rided by free trade ideologues and by some foreign observers as covert or
contingent protectionism, these fair trade concepts have both a coherent
rationale and an important political role in U.S. trade policy.
The rationale for vigorous enforcement of statutes directed against
"unfair" trade practices is a corollary of the basic free trade practices of
U.S. international economic policy. If the United States says to its man-
ufacturers and other industries that it expects them to behave in an eco-
nomically rational manner, making decisions on the basis of market
forces, then it is implicitly being said as well that those companies have
the right to expect that the success of those decisions will be determined
by market forces, undistorted by the actions of foreign governments or
by anticompetitive or unfair practices of foreign competitors. Under this
rationale, it is unfair for the foreign competitors to take business from the
more efficient U.S. company by means of dumping (discriminatory or
below-cost pricing) or by virtue of costs made artificially low by subsidi-
zation. In short, there are certain "rules of the game" which the United
States has a right to expect that foreign governments and foreign export-
ers will follow. Where those rules are violated, the integrity of the free
market is undermined.
From a political standpoint, most U.S. administrations have also be-
lieved that the unfair trade remedies serve as a safety valve to deal with
pressures for protectionism. Thus, pressure on the President to erect
quotas for the protection of specific industries, or to retaliate against
countries with large trade surpluses against the United States, can be met
by the response, "We can't do that, but we can deal with these problems
by tough enforcement of the laws against unfair trading practices." Simi-
larly, petitions for protectionist measures on behalf of domestic indus-
tries are often met with the response, "It's not our policy to take the type
of protectionist action you want, but if you can find unfair foreign trade
practices, we will move aggressively against them."
U.S. trade laws and policies cannot be meaningfully analyzed by
starting from the assumption that their basic purpose is to promote ad-
justment of U.S. industries to import competition. Rather, both law and
policy are more accurately understood as preserving the integrity of the
free market in two ways. First, by establishing and enforcing rules of fair
trading which eliminate distortions of the free market caused by foreign
government intervention (principally through subsidies) or by unfair
pricing tactics (discriminatory or below-cost pricing) by foreign competi-
tors. Second, by balancing the political pressure arising from the loss, or
threatened loss, of domestic jobs to import competition against the diplo-
matic, political and economic adverse consequences of protective meas-
ures, and by striking that balance in a way which ensures that protection
will be the exception, not the norm.
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II. THE LOOMING CRISIS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY
We stand today at a juncture at which these trade laws and policies
will be subjected to enormous stresses. The reason, of course, is that the
U.S. trade account has incurred massive deficits, $170 billion in 1987
alone. This has occurred at a time when substantial impediments stand
in the way of corrective macroeconomic action. The federal budget defi-
cit, in particular the fact that the nation has increasingly turned to for-
eign lenders to finance the budget deficit and the high levels of private
U.S. indebtedness, constitutes a major constraint on currency devalua-
tion. The great danger is that foreign lenders, should they perceive a
continuing decline in the value of the dollar, may stop supplying the
funds needed to sustain increasing U.S. debt levels, or even worse, may
start to pull their money out of U.S. debt markets. This would provoke a
credit crisis, a sharp rise in U.S. interest rates and a deep and perhaps
uncontrollable U.S. recession.
With governmental, business and consumer debt all at extremely
high levels it is unlikely that the trade account can be improved by an
induced recession and a consequent contraction in demand for imports.
In the current debt-heavy situation, a recession could lead quickly to
debt defaults, foreclosures and the type of severe deflationary pressures
that could create a downward economic spiral reminiscent of the 1930s.
Also, the U.S. savings rate has lagged badly behind that of other
developed countries. This will make it more difficult to achieve the mod-
ernization of U.S. industry necessary to improve U.S. international com-
petitiveness. The situation is exacerbated by an emphasis on personal
and corporate income taxes for funding government at all levels. This
reliance seems likely to continue in light of the strong political opposition
to consumption taxes (sales, excise or value-added taxes).
Finally, as the U.S. debt-driven demand has continued to grow, util-
ization of capacity in U.S. manufacturing has risen rapidly over the last
year. This raises a serious question as to how much further progress can
be made in increasing U.S. exports.
III. PRESENT U.S. TRADE POLICY, AND WHY THAT POLICY IS
LIKELY TO FALL SHORT
The Reagan administration has sought to deal with the trade deficit
by means of a novel, and to date largely unsuccessful, combination of
trade-related policies.
A. Selective Dollar Protectionism
Since the Plaza Agreement of September 1985, the major U.S. pol-
icy tool for rectifying the trade imbalance has been the encouragement of
a steep drop in the value of the dollar against the Japanese yen and the
major currencies of Western Europe. So extreme has been the dollar's
decline that a charge that rivals or exceeds that of the old Smoot-Hawley
Vol. 14:115 1988
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 14 [1988], Iss. , Art. 19
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol14/iss/19
Cunningham-TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Tariff has been imposed against competitive merchandise from those
countries. In the case of Japan, this charge now exceeds 100%. This
currency devaluation, however, has been distinctly selective. Canada,
Latin America, Australia and the export-oriented countries of the Pacific
Rim' have been largely unaffected by the dollar's fall. In some cases, as
in Latin America and Australia, the dollar has actually risen against the
local currencies.
B. Pressure for Foreign Economic Stimulus
Since September 1985, the Reagan administration has continuously,
and at times stridently, urged Japan and the major European nations
(principally West Germany) to adopt macroeconomic policies aimed at
stimulating domestic demand in those countries, including tax cuts, in-
terest rate reductions and increased government spending on public
works. The theory has been that increased consumption in those coun-
tries would reduce their exports as companies devoted more of their pro-
duction to supplying the domestic market and creating demand for
imports from the United States.
Japan has gone far in complying with U.S. requests of this nature,
and imports into Japan have increased, but not U.S. imports. Japanese
exports have remained at high levels. In the case of West Germany, U.S.
pleas for economic stimulus have fallen on deaf ears, owing primarily to
that country's tremendous fear of inflation. Indeed, inflation concern is
high throughout much of Western Europe, and there is widespread talk
today of the possibility of Europe-wide increases in interest rates in an
effort to head off a perceived resurgence of inflationary pressures.
C. "Toughness" Against Unfair Foreign Barriers to U.S. Exports
Contemporaneously with the Plaza Agreement, the Reagan admin-
istration sought to defuse U.S. political pressure for protection against
imports (especially in the form of a bill to limit textile imports) by an-
nouncing a new "get tough" policy against unfair practices by foreign
governments. The main vehicle for the new policy has been section 301
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which permits the U.S. Trade
Representatives to respond to U.S. industry concerns about unfair for-
eign government practices by negotiating agreements to eliminate those
practices, by filing complaints under GATT dispute resolution proce-
dures, and by recommending to the President that he order retaliation
against imports from a country that refuses to abandon its unfair
practices.
Prior to September 1985, section 301 had fallen into disuse, owing
largely to skepticism in the U.S. business community that forceful action
3 In recent years, Korea, Taiwan and to a lesser extent Singapore, have grudgingly permitted
their currencies to appreciate against the dollar by relatively small percentages compared with Eu-
rope and Japan. All three nations are now resisting further appreciation.
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could be obtained under this entirely discretionary statute. All that
changed with the 1985 announcement. To emphasize the new policy, the
administration even commenced a practice of initiating cases without
waiting for industry petitions. Viewed in the context of specific cases, the
record to date has been good. Most of the cases since September 1985
have reached resolutions that have significantly improved the competi-
tive situation of the aggrieved U.S. exporters. The cases involving the
large dollar amounts, however, have proved most intractable. The Brazil
"informatics" case is a good example. The overall impact of these cases
on the U.S. trade deficit has to date been quite small.
The Reagan administration is optimistic that these policies will
eventually eliminate, or significantly reduce or stabilize, the massive U.S.
trade deficit. It would be surprising in the extreme if such a huge cur-
rency depreciation against many of our major trading partners did not
have substantial trade effects, but those effects have certainly been
delayed. To date, the benefits have been seen almost entirely in terms of
increasing U.S. exports, and imports have shown a distressing tendency
to keep rising even faster than exports in most periods.
In short, results to date must be described as disappointing. There
are a number of reasons why this policy mix has not worked better, and
why further improvement in the U.S. trade account (especially on the
import side) may prove difficult without new policies or a major change
in economic conditions, such as a recession. There are six major factors
working against success of the administration's trade policies.
1. The Selectiveness of the Dollar Depreciation
As noted earlier, the dollar decline has focused almost entirely on
the currencies of Japan and Western Europe. A major consequence of
this phenomenon is that U.S. manufacturers do not necessarily benefit
from reduced price competitiveness on the part of Japanese and Western
European sellers. Rather, exporters from Canada, the Pacific Rim newly
industrialized countries, or other low currency countries gain a substan-
tial part of the U.S. market lost by the Japanese and West Germans.
This phenomenon will be especially pronounced when, as is the case
now, manufacturers in those countries tend to be at a cost advantage
over U.S. rivals and expanding capacity more rapidly.
2. Tactics by Foreign Exporters to Offset Currency Savings
Currency depreciation can affect trade flows only by changing the
price relationship between foreign and U.S. produced merchandise. The
problem for the United States is that foreign firms have adopted pricing
policies with respect to their U.S. exports that have greatly reduced the
impact of the change in currency values. Specifically, they have kept
their U.S. prices lower than their home market prices, and in many cases
Vol. 14:115 1988
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lower than the fully allocated cost of production, in order to remain com-
petitive with U.S. merchandise and to retain U.S. market share.
American manufacturers, on the other hand, have seen foreign
firms' U.S. price increases as an opportunity to raise their own prices
rather than increase market share. There are two main reasons for this
divergence in pricing behavior. First, foreign manufacturers are more
oriented to market share and production level maximization than are
American firms, who tend to put immediate profit maximization as their
top priority. For many foreign firms, maintenance of U.S. market share
is especially important because this is their largest export market. Sec-
ond, many foreign manufacturers view exports differently than home
market sales and differently than U.S. companies view exports. The pur-
pose of exports, in the planning of these foreign companies, is to utilize
that portion of manufacturing capacity not filled by domestic sales.
Under this system, it is profitable to continue making export sales even
when export prices fall below fully-allocated cost so long as prices are
sufficient to recoup variable costs. This means that a currency swing of
thirty percent or more will be absorbed by the foreign seller rather than
result in a change of its U.S. prices. American companies, in contrast,
tend not to make a distinction between the functions of exports and do-
mestic sales. Rather, they price all sales at essentially the same ratio to
cost of production.
3. Foreign Firms' Cost Reductions
Especially in the case of Japan, exporters have been adept at reduc-
ing costs by shifting component production and raw materials sourcing
to low-currency countries on the Pacific Rim or in Latin America.
4. Foreign Government Intervention
In the trade areas that involve a very large volume of goods, and
consequently large domestic employment, governments are often unwill-
ing to permit currency changes to cause a shift in production away from
their country. Instead, they attempt to offset the exchange rate adversity
by industry-specific subsidies, import restrictions or other schemes.
Examples of this phenomenon during the recent dollar decline range
from European subsidies for Airbus Industrie to Japanese agricultural
import restrictions and European Community subsidies in the agricul-
tural sector to more complex schemes such as the Japanese programs for
the aluminum industry which entailed import protection on finished alu-
minum, together with subsidies to facilitate the transfer of primary alu-
minum production to Japanese-controlled facilities in low-currency
countries.
5. The Disappearance of U.S. Production
In a number of industries, ranging from radios, televisions and vide-
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ocassette recorders to substantial portions of the semiconductor industry,
the disappearance of U.S. producers leaves foreign competitors free to
raise their U.S. prices as the dollar falls. American consumers pay a
higher price for those products and the trade deficit is increased by the
higher value of the imports.
6. Capacity Limitations on U.S. Export Growth
The administration is fond of describing how American industry has
reduced costs in the last few years, becoming "lean and mean." This is
certainly true, but this increased cost-competitiveness has been achieved
in significant part by measures which reduce production capacity: em-
ployment reduction, older plant closure, and production consolidation
into fewer facilities. Such capacity reductions are one reason why many
U.S. industries are now operating near the effective limits of their capac-
ity. This suggests that, until and unless industry can expand capacity
significantly,4 further growth in exports may be much slower than has
been experienced over the past several years.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR POLICY CHANGE IN THE NEXT
ADMINISTRATION
With less than a year remaining in office, it is clear that the Reagan
administration will embark on no major changes in trade policy. Ac-
cordingly, we must look to the campaigns of Vice President Bush and
Governor Dukakis for any significant initiatives. In this regard, one
should understand that a U.S. presidential campaign is not the time to
expect prescriptions for strong medicine of the type that may ultimately
be necessary to deal with the trade deficit at the macroeconomic level.
The types of plans needed include: specific proposals for the serious re-
duction of the budget deficit, such as defense cuts, social security reduc-
tions, and tax increases; shifting a significant part of U.S. taxation from
income taxes to consumption taxes; inducing a recession to reduce de-
mand for imports, or providing systematic governmental guidance of or
assistance to investment and exports, and; long-term business planning
(pejoratively referred to as an "industrial policy").
Indeed, this campaign year seems to be characterized by an aversion
to specific proposals, especially in the economic area. Nevertheless, there
are some legitimate observations that can be made as to the trade ap-
proaches of both leading candidates.
A. George Bush
For a man who once derided "voodoo economics," Vice President
4 Recent figures on industrial investment and on capital goods sales and imports are encourag-
ing for long-term prospects. This is provided the investment is for expansion, not simply for replace-
ment of outmoded equipment.
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Bush now seeks, to a surprising extent, to identify himself with the eco-
nomic policies of the Reagan administration. On the trade issue, Bush's
rhetoric is more free trade, more anti-interventionist than Reagan's.
In general, a Bush administration could l.e expected to rely almost
entirely on macroeconomic approaches to the trade deficit: further dol-
lar depreciation and more pressure on Japan and West Germany to stim-
ulate domestic demand. Moreover, like Reagan, Bush displays a distinct
preference for dealing with the deficit by increasing exports rather than
by reducing imports. Finally, the Vice President's background and pre-
vious pronouncements suggest that diplomatic and strategic considera-
tions will continue to take priority over trade and economic
considerations in international decision making and even in specific trade
cases.
B. Michael Dukakis
In the early stages of the campaign, Governor Dukakis did not
stress trade as a major issue. This is likely to change, however, as the
Trade Bill deadlock between Congress and the president moves the Dem-
ocratic Party toward greater emphasis on trade as a campaign issue.
Dukakis professes a basic preference for free trade, yet stresses the
need for a greater government role in improving U.S. competitiveness.
Although the governor has refrained from addressing specific trade is-
sues, his campaign literature advocates "vigorous enforcement" of the
laws dealing with unfair trade practices, including section 301 as well as
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. It also mentions an in-
creased willingness to grant temporary escape clause protection to im-
port-injured industries in return for commitments by those industries to
take steps to regain competitiveness. Finally, his literature suggests a
"New Global Economic Bargain" with major U.S. trading partners, in-
volving reduction of the U.S. budget deficit, reform of Japan's interna-
tional economic policies, greater growth in Europe, creative approaches
to the less developed countries' debt crisis and commitment to a success-
ful resolution of the GATT Uruguay Round.
There is an interesting point here. Governor Dukakis' "Massachu-
setts economic miracle" strongly emphasized the emerging, high-technol-
ogy industries, implying a willingness at the national level to facilitate the
transfer of resources from older industries to these newer and more com-
petitive businesses. The points listed above, taken from his campaign
literature, suggest a different orientation, one toward protecting and revi-
talizing basic, traditional areas of the U.S. industrial sector.
V. PROBABLE TRENDS IN U.S. TRADE POLICY
Regardless of which party wins the 1988 election, certain trends are
likely to emerge in U.S. trading policy. Irrespective of philosophy, the
next President will have to deal with the trade pressures arising from a
9
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likely recession sometime early in his term, and with the necessity of
achieving at least a neutral trade balance, if not a surplus, by early in the
1990s.
A. Increased Import Relief Litigation
With the dollar having fallen against the currencies of Europe and
Japan, most exporters in those countries are now maintaining U.S. mar-
ket share by some degree of discriminatory or below-cost pricing or, less
frequently, with the aid of government subsidies. When the U.S. econ-
omy begins to soften, with the result that U.S. industries will become able
to prove injury, this condition will give rise to a large number of an-
tidumping cases and a smaller, but still substantial, increase in counter-
vailing duty cases.
There is an open question whether or not the next recession will also
see an increase in discretionary import relief cases under sections 202,
406, and 232. The key factor here is the attitude of the next administra-
tion toward such cases. Presumably, a Dukakis election victory would
be a signal to major industries that such cases would be more likely to
succeed than was the case under the Reagan administration.
B. Continued Use of Section 301 to Open Foreign Markets
With U.S. industry increasingly competitive because of cost reduc-
tions and the lower dollar, elimination of foreign barriers to U.S. imports
will become increasingly important. Any U.S. administration would pre-
fer to see the trade gap closed by increased exports rather than by re-
duced imports. The major questions are whether or not foreign
countries' resistance to U.S. exports will increase as their domestic indus-
tries become relatively less competitive, and whether or not the next ad-
ministration will be more ready than President Reagan was to use U.S.
retaliation as a lever to open foreign markets.
C. "Wholesale" v. "Retail" Trade Negotiation
Many in Congress, and not a few in the upper levels of the U.S.
trade bureaucracy, have become increasingly frustrated with the per-
ceived slow pace of progress in trade negotiations with a number of coun-
tries, notably Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Brazil. Proposals have begun to
emerge for a change in U.S. negotiating practice away from "retail" talks
dealing with a specific industry or government policy, toward some
"wholesale" approach which would cut across product lines and encom-
pass a number of industries or even the total spectrum of trade between
the United States and that country. Both the Gephart and Super 301
amendments in the Trade Bill represent approaches of this type. A basic
problem is that such a "wholesale" approach would represent a move
away from eliminating unfairness and toward governmental management
of trade volumes.
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D. Bilateralism
A related trend is the use by the United States of bilateral, rather
than multilateral, approaches to the setting of trading rules. The U.S.-
Canada and U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreements are examples of this ap-
proach, and a framework agreement has been reached for talks with
Mexico. Even Japan has expressed interest in such talks. Whether this
trend will continue depends largely on the progress in the GATT Uru-
guay Round. If those GATT negotiations were to bog down or to fail, a
turn to bilateralism could be an attractive option for the United States.
E. Attention to Adjustment - That's Right, Adjustment!
Despite the historic lack of attention to trade adjustment, and de-
spite the pessimism with which I began these remarks, circumstances
may now be developing which could force the next administration to pay
serious attention to the development of a trade adjustment policy. In a
long-term perspective, the U.S. economy is in an era of fundamental
change, moving away from reliance on the traditional "basic industries"
(metal, autos, heavy manufacturing) toward a greater emphasis on infor-
mation industries, services and the high technology manufacturing area.
These changes will inevitably cause serious dislocations in terms of job
loss and loss of the economic base of cities and regions.
Trade pressures are a major force behind these shifts. Therefore,
government policies aimed at easing the pain of these economic changes
(worker retraining or relocation, plant modernization, coordination be-
tween government and industry in investment and plant location deci-
sions) are in a real sense "trade adjustment" policies. Under the Reagan
administration, policy has been aimed at minimizing government inter-
vention and allowing market forces to govern these changes. The ex-
tended economic recovery has made it politically possible to continue
such policies despite some severe regional pains. However, the onset of a
recession is likely to make it politically necessary to adopt policies to ease
the burdens on laid-off employees, affected industries and economically
injured communities. Thus, trade adjustment may well become a signifi-
cant U.S. policy concern. The Dukakis campaign seems to be anticipat-
ing that possibility already.
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